We advise on both hospital and school transactions, and we routinely see the same investors and family offices evaluate both β€” sometimes in the same conversation. It's an understandable instinct: both sectors involve capital-intensive physical infrastructure, both are increasingly the subject of platform consolidation strategies in India, and both trade on EBITDA rather than revenue once a business is established. The comparison isn't unreasonable. It's just incomplete in one specific place that changes the entire analysis.

Where the Comparison Genuinely Holds

Here's where it breaks: for a hospital, PropCo/OpCo is a choice β€” a capital-efficiency and balance-sheet strategy that a promoter can adopt, modify, or abandon based on what suits growth plans. For a school, as we've covered in detail in our guide to how these deals actually get structured, the equivalent OpCo–PropCo–ManCo split is not a choice at all. It's the legal workaround required by India's not-for-profit principle, which mandates that the entity holding an educational licence β€” the OpCo β€” cannot be a for-profit company and cannot issue equity to investors. A hospital's OpCo can be, and often is, a straightforward for-profit company with direct shareholders. A school's cannot be, by law, in almost every case involving an existing Indian-promoted institution.

What This Does to the Multiple

The practical result shows up directly in valuation. Indian healthcare has real, if wide, disclosed benchmarks: one 2026 industry report on Indian healthcare private equity puts quality hospital platform transactions at high-teens EV/EBITDA and above, broadly in line with listed hospital chains, with EY-Parthenon's own Q2FY26 sector update showing multiples for listed players ranging from the mid-teens to over 30x in higher-growth specialty and diagnostics segments. As we've written elsewhere, no equivalent public benchmark exists for Indian K-12 or higher-ed institutions β€” not because nobody has done the deals, but because the mandatory not-for-profit OpCo structure makes the comparable-transaction data far harder to standardise and far less likely to be disclosed in the first place.

An investor pricing a school acquisition using a hospital-sector multiple as a reference point is not just using the wrong number β€” they're implicitly assuming a legal ownership structure the school deal cannot actually offer.

The Risk Profile Is Different Too, Not Just the Legal Structure

Even setting structure aside, the same India-focused healthcare research is candid about what high-teens entry multiples actually demand: sustained mid-teens earnings growth and no adverse regulatory event across the holding period, with operational value creation left to do essentially all the remaining work. Healthcare's risk is largely an execution risk sitting on top of a well-understood valuation framework. Education's risk starts a step earlier β€” it's a benchmarking risk, where the investor often can't be fully confident the multiple itself is right before execution risk even enters the picture.

Evaluating a platform play across healthcare or education?

MAS Advisory works across both sectors and can help you apply the right underwriting logic to each β€” not the other one's.

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Healthcare M&A data based on EY-Parthenon India's Q2FY26 Healthcare Sector Update (January 2026) and InsightRx's "Private Equity in Indian Healthcare 2026" report (July 2026). Max Healthcare's asset-light and REIT strategy based on publicly disclosed company information. Education deal-structuring points based on MAS Advisory's own published guides. General guidance only β€” specific transaction terms and applicable multiples should be assessed on a deal-by-deal basis.